re: WiMax's Small Steps to SecurityI really can't see any reason to expect that WiMAX will be less secure than cellular data services. Wi-Fi security was a mess because the tools were poor (WEP), and the networks were installed by amateurs. Carriers like Sprint know what has to be done to secure a network, and those "driver flaw" issues that were identified at Black Hat have largely been dubunked.
By the way, referencing AES as the encryption standard 802.16d (i.e. 802.16-2004) and EAP being considered for 802.16e (i.e. 802.16-2005) is a bit of apples-and-oranges. AES is an encryption standard, and EAP is a framework for authentication.
As far as I know AES will be part of the final mobile WiMAX profiles as well (if you know different perhaps you could enlighten me further), possibly along with possibly along with other encryption specs. I mentioned the debate over which authentication mechanisms to illustrate how fluid the whole security situation around WiMAX still seems to be.
The specific Mac Hack at Black Hat may have been debunked but I hope that doesn't mean that people stop taking these driver-level hacks seriously. The Sprint people reitarated their concerns on this point several times -- they're taking it seriously.
re: WiMax's Small Steps to SecurityAnother point worth mentioning is KT's decision decision to use the SIM card combined with EAP functionality for Wibro authentication. KT can also leverage the secure SIM platform to roam onto KTF's 3G network and serve as a platform for other secure applications.
re: WiMax's Small Steps to SecurityI donGÇÖt know about specific exploits and such (or really understand much of this GÇô IGÇÖm too dumb), but what IGÇÖve picked up from asking experts:
* The 3G network side has vulnerabilities (around GTP and PDP hijacks, etc), but this can be dealt with and wonGÇÖt affect end-users much. Only operators and very security-sensitive companies need worry about this.
* Inside the tunnel attacks are a major concern for everyone. Apparently, simulations show a virus loose in the handset population (i.e. that can replicate) could potentially bring down a cell network in 8 minutes!
* Attacks on the handset OS. I think Series 60 v3 (Symbian) is trying to shift to signed apps to try and mitigate this. DonGÇÖt know about Windows Mobile or Linux. Seems like a huge worry.
* Vulnerabilities from connecting your (compromised) phone to your PC. The phone becomes a Trojan horse and compromises the PC. Again, this seems like a major worry.
By the way, referencing AES as the encryption standard 802.16d (i.e. 802.16-2004) and EAP being considered for 802.16e (i.e. 802.16-2005) is a bit of apples-and-oranges. AES is an encryption standard, and EAP is a framework for authentication.